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ARTICLE 
UPDATING THE MEDICAL HEARSAY EXCEPTION: 
MARYLAND SHOULD MODERNIZE ITS APPROACH TO 
THE MEDICAL TREATMENT HEARSAY EXCEPTION 
By: Amy Sevigny * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine you are a pediatrician employed by the Baltimore City 
Department of Social Services. A six-year-old child victim of alleged 
sexual abuse has been referred to you by a social worker. I When the 
child comes to your office, you explain to the child that she is at your 
office because there is a concern about her health due to an experience 
that may have happened to her? You perform a complete ~hysical 
examination of the child and order routine laboratory tests. Your 
physical examination of the child reveals evidence of trauma and 
penetration to the vagina and anus by a foreign object.4 During the 
examination, the child tells you that a particular person hurt her when 
he put his penis in her "privates" and her "bottom" more than ten 
times.5 
When the alleged perpetrator of the sexual abuse is put on trial, the 
prosecution informs you that, based on how the Court of Special 
4 
B.S. Cornell University, Candidate for J.D. in May 2008, University of Baltimore School 
of Law. Editor-in-Chief of Journal of Environmental Law at University of Baltimore 
School of Law. Special thanks to Professor Lynn McLain. 
See, e.g., Low v. State, 119 Md. App. 413, 416, 705 A.2d 67, 69 (1998) (holding that the 
prosecution's expert was only an examining physician and not a treating physician, thus 
the guarantee of trustworthiness was not present, and therefore the pediatrician's 
testimony to statements made by the child patient to her during a physical examination 
did not fall under the medical diagnosis/treatment hearsay exception and was 
inadmissible). This fact pattern is derived, in part, from the facts of Low. 
The pediatrician's testimony that it was her habit to explain to her child-patients that they 
were at her office because of concern about their health, following an unhappy 
experience that might have happened to them, met the requirements of Maryland Rule 5-
406. See Low, 119 Md. App. at 422-23, 428, 705 A.2d at 72. The pediatrician's 
testimony about this habit showed that the pediatrician had made such a statement to this 
particular child. See 5 LYNN MCLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE - STATE AND FEDERAL § 
406: 1 (2d ed. 200 I) (discussing how, under Maryland Rule 5-406, it must be shown that 
the person had "an established, regular response to a repeated, specific situation" in order 
for the hearsay evidence to be admissible as evidence of habit). 
Low, 119 Md. App. at 421,705 A.2d at 71. 
Jd. at 416,705 A.2d at 69. 
Jd. at 416, 705 A.2d at 69. 
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Appeals of Maryland has interpreted the Maryland Rules of Evidence, 
your testimony about statements the child made to you during your 
examination are inadmissible hearsay. Your testimony would not fall 
within the hearsay exception of statements made by a person seeking 
medical treatment "for purposes of medical treatment or medical 
diagnosis in contemplation of treatment,,6 ("medical treatment hearsay 
exception") and therefore you cannot testify to the child's statements.7 
The inadmissibility of this evidence as substantive evidence is the 
sad reality for Maryland prosecutors, pediatricians, child sexual abuse 
victims, and others who are trying to protect victims of child sexual 
abuse.8 The plain language of Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(4) ("Md. Rule 
5-803(b)(4)") is quite broad and includes statements made by a person 
seeking treatment not only "for purposes of medical treatment" but 
also for "medical diagnosis in contemplation ojtreatment.,,9 However, 
Maryland courts have narrowly construed the rule's language lO which 
was intended to codify the common law medical treatment exception 
that "admit[ s] certain hearsay statements based on their inherent 
trustworthiness."!! Maryland courts have undertaken the 
trustworthiness analysis in many cases involving the medical treatment 
9 
10 
II 
MD. RULE 5-803(b)(4) (LexisNexis 2007). 
The child's statements to you may possibly be admitted for only the limited purpose of 
giving the basis for your opinion and not for any substantive purpose. See MD. RULE 5-
703 (describing the limiting jury instruction and stating that upon request, the court must 
instruct the jury to use those facts and data "'only for the purposes of evaluating the 
validity and probative value of the expert's opinion or inference"'); 7 LYNN McLAIN, 
MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE 165 (3d ed. 2007) [hereinafter "McLAIN RULES"] 
(explaining that "[ u ]pon request, the court must give a limiting instruction to the jury that 
those facts and data are admitted not as substantive evidence" but as non-substantive 
evidence). 
This evidence may also be inadmissible in a criminal case because it violates the 
Confrontation Clause under the testimonial analysis. A discussion of the Confrontation 
Clause in relation to the medical treatment hearsay exception is beyond the scope of this 
paper. See generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (analyzing the 
testimonial aspect of medical treatment statements made for the purpose of diagnosis); 
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 278, at 291 n.12 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006) 
(explaining that Confrontation Clause issues may arise under the "testimonial" analysis); 
Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring the 
Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REv. 511, 600-01 (2005) (discussing the 
scope and meaning of the testimonial concept). 
MD. RULE 5-803(b)(4) (emphasis added). 
See infra part III. 
David S. Gray, The Medical Treatment Hearsay Exception in Maryland: A Low Point in 
Clarity for Practitioners and Protection for Litigants, 29 U. BALT. L. REv. 237, 244 
(2000). 
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hearsay exception. 12 The courts, however, have applied multiple, 
conflicting standards that have created confusion. 13 
To avoid this confusion, Maryland should adopt the modem 
approach of the federal rules, and the rules of a vast majority of the 
states, and extend the hearsay exception to patients' out-of-court 
statements made to physicians, including those hired as expert 
witnesses in preparation for litigation, "for the purposes of' medical 
treatment or diagnosis.1 4 This would relieve the courts from making 
nice distinctions between treating and non-treating physicians, 
decrease the possibility of reversible error and retrial, avoid the need 
for limiting instructions that could confuse jurors, and allow the fact-
finder to hear and weigh the credibility of all statements made for 
purposes of medical treatment or diagnosis. 15 
Part II of this article provides background on the rationale 
underlying the common law medical treatment hearsay exception. 
Part III gives a chronology of the Maryland common law and 
describes how Maryland courts have applied the common law 
rationale. Part IV describes the modem federal approach to the 
medical treatment hearsay exception and gives examples of how the 
approach has been applied in federal courts. Part V proposes that 
Maryland amend Md. Rule 5-803(b)(4) to mirror the fairer approach 
of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4) ("FRE 803(4),,).16 Part V 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
See infra part Ill. 
See infra part III. Compare Low, 119 Md. App. at 425-26, 705 A.2d at 73-74 (1998) 
(holding that a pediatrician's testimony to statements made by a child sexual abuse 
victim to the pediatrician did not fall under the medical treatment hearsay exception and 
were therefore inadmissible because the pediatrician was only an examining physician 
and not a treating physician which meant the guarantee of trustworthiness was not 
present), with In re Rachel T., 77 Md. App. 20, 34-36, 549 A.2d 27, 33-36 (1988) 
(holding that a social worker's testimony to statements made by a child sexual abuse 
victim to the social worker did fall under the medical treatment hearsay exception and 
were therefore admissible because the child was almost five years old and her injuries 
were internal and possibly indicative of the transmission of a "communicable disease"), 
and Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 20, 30-34, 536 A.2d 666, 680-83 (1988) (holding that 
a pediatrician's testimony to statements made by a child sexual abuse victim to the 
pediatrician did not fall under the medical treatment hearsay exception and were 
therefore inadmissible because the child was too young to have "a purposeful 
motivation" to accurately describe her injuries in order to receive proper medical 
treatment and therefore her statements lacked trustworthiness guarantees). 
See infra part IV. 
See infra part IV. 
See FED. R. EVID. 803(4) and accompanying Advisory Committee's Note. The Advisory 
Committee's Note states, in part: 
Conventional doctrine has excluded from the hearsay exception, as not 
within its guarantee of truthfulness, statements to a physician consulted only 
for the purpose of enabling [the physician] to testify. While these statements 
4 University of Baltimore Law Forum [Vol. 38 
concludes that the federal approach is fairer, more understandable, and 
easier to administer than Maryland's current approach by applying the 
medical treatment hearsay e'xception to all of a patient's statements 
made to a physician that are relevant to medical diagnosis if the 
statements are otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence and, in 
criminal cases, admissible subject to the Confrontation Clause. 17 
II. COMMON LAW RATIONALE UNDERLYING THE MEDICAL 
TREATMENT HEARSAY EXCEPTION 
Under common law, statements made by a person seeking medical 
treatment to a physician for the purpose of receiving medical treatment 
fall under a well-established and long-standing exception to the 
hearsay rule. 18 Similar to most hearsay exceptions, admission of 
statements made for the purpose of medical treatment is generally 
based on trustworthiness. 19 
Under common law, four types of statements have been included 
under the medical treatment hearsay exception.2o First, a patient's 
statements to a physician about the patient's then existing bodily 
condition are admissible under this hearsay exception because "there 
are no problems with perception or memory.,,21 There is no perception 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
were not admissible as substantive evidence, the expert was allowed to state 
the basis of his opinion, including statements of this kind. The distinction 
thus called for was one most unlikely to be made by juries. The rule 
accordingly rejects the limitation. 
FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee's note. 
A discussion of the Confrontation Clause in relation to the medical treatment hearsay 
exception is beyond the scope of this paper. See generally MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 
278, at 291 n.12 (explaining that Confrontation Clause issues may arise under the 
"testimonial" analysis); see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (analyzing 
the testimonial aspect of medical treatment statements made for the purpose of 
diagnosis); Mosteller, supra note 8, at 600-01 (2005) (discussing the scope and meaning 
of the testimonial concept). 
See Robert P. Mosteller, Child Sexual Abuse and Statements for the Purpose of Medical 
Diagnosis or Treatment, 67 N.C. L. REv. 257, 257 (1989) (describing the common law 
rationale of the medical treatment hearsay exception). 
Gray, supra note 11, at 242-45. The common law is also based to a lesser degree on 
necessity. See 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §§ 1420, 1421, 1423 
(James H. Chadbourn rev. 1974) (describing necessity as when the declarant is 
unavailable such as after a dying declaration or when evidence of equal value is not 
available, such as under the excited utterance hearsay exception). 
Gray, supra note 11, at 246-49. 
6A LYNN MCLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE- STATE AND FEDERAL § 803(4):1, at 216 (2d ed. 
2001); see Sellman v. Wheeler, 95 Md. 751, 754-55, 54 A. 512, 514 (1902) (physician's 
testimony about patient's statements to him were admissible, despite the hearsay rule, 
because the patient's statements were based on the patient's then existing physical 
condition). 
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problem because a patient is in the best position to perceive her own 
physical sensations, and there is no memory problem because the 
patient is describing her present physical condition.22 Courts also find 
these statements to be trustworthy based on the patient's belief "that 
the effectiveness of the treatment depends on the accuracy of the 
information provided to the doctor" by the patient.23 Under common 
law, the declarant's selfish interest in obtaining proper medical 
treatment guarantees that the declarant's statement about her 
symptoms is truthfu1.24 Some statements of this type that fall under 
the medical treatment hearsay exception may also fall under other 
hearsay exceptions including the excited utterance exception, the 
present sense impression exception, and the then existing mental, 
emotional, or physical condition exception.25 
Second, a patient's statements to a physician about the patient's 
past symptoms are also now admissible under the medical treatment 
hearsay exception.26 Even though a memory problem exists when a 
patient gives medical history to a physician by describing past 
symptoms, it has been accepted that, similar to describing her then 
existing bodily condition, the patient's desire to be truthful in order to 
receive proper medical diagnosis and treatment outweighs any 
memory problems.27 
Third, statements made by a patient to a physician about the 
patient's medical history that do not describe past symptoms, but 
rather, describe the cause or external source of a condition, also fall 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
McLAIN, supra note 21, § 803(3):2, at 210. 
MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 277, at 284. 
See McLAIN, supra note 21, § 803(4):1, at 216-17 (noting that the patient's "desire to 
receive a proper medical diagnosis and, thus, proper treatment, provides a strong 
incentive for sincerity") (citing, e.g., Candella v. Subsequent Injury Fund, 277 Md. 120, 
123-24,353 A.2d 263,265 (1976)). 
Gray, supra note II, at 246-47 n.60. For example, if a person makes a statement to a 
physician while the person is "under the stress" of a traumatic event, Maryland courts 
will admit the statement under the excited utterance exception. MD. RULE 5-803(b)(2); 
see also FED. R. EVID. 803(2). If a person makes a statement to a physician that describes 
or explains an event or condition "while the declarant was perceiving the event or 
condition, or immediately thereafter," Maryland courts will admit the statement under the 
present sense impression exception. MD. RULE 5-803(b)(\); see alsq FED. R. EVlD. 
803(1). In addition, if a person makes a statement to a physician that relates to the 
person's "then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition" and is 
offered to prove then existing condition or future action, Maryland courts will admit the 
statement under the then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition exception. 
MD. RULE 5-803(b)(3); see also FED. R. EVlD. 803(3). 
Gray, supra note 11, at 247. 
McLAIN, supra note 21, § 803(4): I, at 216-17. 
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within this exception.28 The statements must be "pathologically 
germane" which means a person29 would reasonably believe that the 
statement would have "sufficient bearing upon and relation to the 
disease or injury from which one suffers. ,,30 The statement must be 
particularly related to the medical condition for which the patient is 
visiting the physician.3) Again, the patient's desire to receive 
appropriate medical diagnosis and treatment "provides a strong 
incentive for sincerity.,,32 Many courts inquire further into the factual 
circumstances underlying the patient's statement and if they find 
apparent insincerity or improper motive, they exclude the evidence?3 
Finally, only statements made in pursuit of treatment by a patient to 
a treating physician qualify under the common law hearsay exception; 
statements made to a non-treating physician do not qualify.34 Under 
the common law, courts have held that statements made by patients to 
non-treating physicians35 lack the trustworthiness guarantee that 
underlies the exception because proper treatment does not "hinge on 
such statements.,,36 Common law allows only treating physicians to 
testify to prove the truth of out-of-court statements made by patients 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
Gray, supra note II, at 247. In certain situations, a physician may view the cause of a 
medical condition as related to diagnosis and treatment while in other situations, such as 
when establishing fault, "neither the patient nor the physician is likely to regard [the 
statements] as related to diagnosis or treatment." MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 277, at 
285. 
The scope of the exception has been examined from the view of the patient as well as the 
physician. See MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 277, at 285 (discussing statements about the 
cause of a condition or injury from the patient's and physician's point of view). 
Marlow v. Cerino, 19 Md. App. 619, 635, 313 A.2d 505,514 (1974) (holding that out-of-
court statements made by a patient to a physician about her alcoholism and schizophrenia 
were sufficiently related to the illness for which she was admitted to the hospital to be 
admissible under the hearsay exception). 
See MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 278, at 286-87 (describing the test for admissibility to 
be "reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment" which is an objective standard). 
McLAIN, supra note 2, § 803(4): I, at 217. 
See MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 278, at 284-87 (describing the common law test for 
admissibility of medical treatment hearsay evidence). 
Gray, supra note II, at 248; see MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 278 at 287 (describing how 
courts were hesitant to admit statements made by patients to physicians who were hired 
as expert witnesses for litigation because the trustworthiness guarantee did not exist). 
Non-treating physicians include purely "examining" physicians who are consulted in 
preparation for litigation. See Rossello v. Friedel, 243 Md. 234, 242-43, 220 A.2d 537, 
541-42 (1966) (excluding testimony from an orthopedist who was hired by the patient's 
employer's worker's compensation insurance carrier to provide orthopedic evaluation 
and not treatment); Wilhelm v. State Traffic Safety Comm'n, 230 Md. 91, 97, 185 A.2d 
715, 717 (1962) (excluding statements made by a patient to a physician about her 
medical history because the physician was not employed by the patient to provide or 
even recommend treatment). 
Gray, supra note 11, at 248. 
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about physical conditions in order to exclude the testimony of medical 
experts who are hired by litigants to testify at tria1.37 
III. THE MARYLAND COMMON LAW APPROACH TO THE 
MEDICAL TREATMENT HEARSA Y EXCEPTION 
Over the last three decades, there has been a trend toward 
abandoning the common law approach and adopting a broader 
approach which allows the trier of fact to hear all statements made by 
patients to physicians whether for the purpose of treatment or 
diagnosis.38 Only seven states, including Maryland, follow the 
common law approach to the medical treatment hearsay exception.39 
Maryland's Rules of Evidence require that, in order for a patient's 
statement to qualify under the medical treatment hearsay exception, 
the statement must have been made "for purposes of medical treatment 
or medical diagnosis in contemplation of treatment.,,40 The rule 
became effective in 1994 but it codified the long-standing Maryland 
common law rule.41 The rule distinguishes, then, between "treating" 
and "non-treating" physicians on the ground that the patient's 
underlying selfish motivation to receive proper medical treatment is 
essential to the hearsay exception.42 This distinction has provided 
greater protection for insurance companies that must litigate actions 
against dishonest policy holders or tort claimants who are feigning or 
exaggerating injury. Unfortunately, however, this narrow approach 
results in the denial of adequate protection to honest policy holders 
and tort claimants, child abuse victims, and others who have suffered 
serious injury. The case law construing this approach is conflicting, 
requires confusing limiting instructions, and h-as resulted in the 
unnecessary creation of reversible error.43 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
See, e.g., Gray, supra note 11, at 253-56 n.I05 (noting that twenty-seven states have 
adopted the federal rule, which broadens the common law approach). 
Gray, supra note II, at 253-56 n.105. The seven states that follow the common law 
approach include Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
and Tennessee. ld. Twenty-seven states have adopted the federal rule language 
verbatim. ld. Ten states have "adopted the spirit" of the federal rule. ld. Six states have 
made a distinction between treating and examining physicians. ld. 
MD. RULE 5-803(b)(4). 
McLAIN RULES, supra note 7, § 3(c)(iii), at 217. 
Gray, supra note 11, at 257. 
See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
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A. General Rule Under Pre-Codification Case Law 
Prior to the adoption of Title 5 of the Maryland Rules, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland applied the restrictive common law approach to 
the medical treatment hearsay rule. For example, in 1976, in Candella 
v. Subsequent Injury Fund,44 the plaintiff, a hotel maid, had suffered 
an electrical shock when she attempted to tum off the power on a 
vacuum cleaner while she was working at the hote1.45 The plaintiff 
claimed she suffered from post-traumatic stress and sought worker's 
compensation from her employer, its Insurer, and the Subsequent 
Injury Fund.46 
The employee's attorney referred her to a psychiatrist who 
examined, but did not treat, the employee.47 The non-treating 
psychiatrist testified as the employee's expert witness in the hearing 
before the Worker's Compensation Commission (WCC), who decided 
in favor of the employee.48 On appeal, the Circuit Court for Anne 
Arundel County granted the defendants' motion to strike the testimony 
of the non-treating psychiatrist, reversed the decision of the trial court, 
and entered judgment for the defendants.49 The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland granted a writ of certiorari prior to the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland hearing the case and affirmed the trial court's 
decision in favor of the employer, insurer, and Subsequent Injury 
Fund.5o 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland applied the "universally 
recognized principle that an attending physician may testify as to the 
medical history related to him by his patient.,,51 The Court held that 
testimony by the psychiatrist was inadmissible hearsay because the 
psychiatrist was a non-treating physician. 52 The Court found the 
psychiatrist was a non-treating physician because he did not render 
"treatment of any kind," the plaintiff did not contemplate treatment by 
44 277 Md. 120, 124-26, 353 A.2d at 264-67 (1976). The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
acknowledged that "a number of states make a distinction which permits the nontreating 
physician to present his conclusions," including the patient's medical history as the basis 
for his conclusions, but not as substantive evidence. Jd. at 124, 353 A.2d at 266. The 
Court "declined, however, to adopt this view despite the criticism aimed at our own more 
restrictive rule." Jd. at 124, 353 A.2d at 266. 
45 Jd. at 122, 353 A.2d at 264. 
46 Jd. at 121-22,353 A.2d at 264. 
47 Jd. at 122,353 A.2d at 264. 
48 Jd. at 121,353 A.2d at 264. 
49 Jd. at 121, 353 A.2d at 264. 
50 Jd. at 121-22,353 A.2d at 264. 
51 Jd. at 123,353 A.2d at 265. 
52 Jd. at 126,353 A.2d at 267. 
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the psychiatrist, and the plaintiff "related the history to the psychiatrist 
knowing that it was merely for the purpose of qualifying him as a' 
witness on her behalf.,,53 Candella stated that the out-of-court 
statements on which the psychiatrist based his conclusions "cannot 
withstand the close scrutiny of hearsay testimony mandated by our 
. d .. ,,54 pnor eClSlOns. 
B. Nonhearsay Limited Purpose Exception 
In 1977, the Court of Appeals of Maryland adopted a new rule in 
Beahm v. Shortall, which slightly loosened restrictions on the common 
law medical treatment hearsay exception. 55 Defendant Beahm was 
driving a tractor during the course of his employment with the 
defendant, Atlantic Furniture Products Co. Inc. ("Atlantic"), when he 
struck an automobile driven by the Plaintiff Shortall.56 Shortall visited 
a neurological surgeon the day after the accident because he suffered 
from double vision, pain behind the left eye, and persistent headaches 
following the accident.57 Four years later, in preparation for litigation, 
defendants hired Dr. Russo, a neurosurgeon, to examine Shortall.58 
Shortall related his subjective symptoms to Dr. Russo during the 
examination. 59 Dr. Russo testified at trial on behalf of Shortall as to 
Shortall's statements to him as they related to his conclusion that the 
symptoms described by Shortall were disabling.6o The trial court 
found in favor of Shortall and the defendants appealed.61 The Court of 
Appeals of Maryland affinned the decision of the trial court.62 
In contrast to the Candella decision, Beahm concluded that a 
physician who examined a patient solely to qualify as an expert, could 
testify about the medical history63 statements the patient made to the 
53 ld. at 126, 353 A.2d at 267. 
54 ld. at 126,353 A.2d at 267. 
55 279 Md. 321, 368 A.2d 1005 (1977). 
56 ld. at 328, 368 A.2d at 1009. 
57 Jd. at 332, 368 A.2d at 1012. 
58 Jd. at 328, 368-A.2d at 1009-10. 
59 ld. at 328, 368 A.2d at 1010. 
60 Jd. at 328, 368 A.2d at 1010. 
61 ld. at 328, 368 A.2d at 1009. 
62 ld. at 344, 368 A.2d at 1018. 
63 The tenn "medical history" encompasses not only statements made by the patient about 
"past events concerning the injury or illness" but also statements made by the patient "in 
giving his symptoms, in describing his feelings or in complaining about the pain he 
experienced." Jd. at 324 n.l, 368 A.2d at 1007 n.l; see Rossello v. Friedel, 243 Md. 234, 
242, 220 A.2d 537, 541 (1966) (stating that what the Court has said about "medical 
history" applies with equal force to "subjective symptoms"). 
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physician, as long as the court gave a limiting instruction to the jury.64 
The instruction would have to explain to the jury that it was to 
consider the patient's statements "as an explanation of the basis of the 
physician's conclusions and not as proof of the truth of those 
statements. ,,65 Based on the new rule announced by Beahm, the 
statements in Candella would have been admissible for this 
nonhearsay purpose with a limiting instruction. 
C. Medical v. Social Disposition Distinction 
If a limiting instruction requirement were not confusing enough, in 
1988, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland further complicated 
the understanding of the exception in contradictory decisions by two 
different panels, in Cassidy v. State66 and In re Rachel T. 67 Both cases 
involved two questions: (1) Do statements pertinent to psychological 
or psychiatric diagnosis and treatment qualify under this hearsay 
exception?;68 and (2) Is the identity of a sexual abuser or aggressor 
pertinent to medical treatment?69 The court answered "no" to both of 
these questions in Cassidy and answered "yes" to both of these 
questions in In re Rachel T.70 
In Cassidy, a two-year-old child abuse victim was brought to the 
hospital by a representative of Child Protective Services three days 
after the abuse and examined by Dr. Arnie Pullman.7! During her 
examination, Dr. Pullman observed numerous bruises on the girl's 
arms, legs, and buttocks, and she saw signs of irritation to the girl's 
genital area.72 During the examination, Dr. Pullman asked the little 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
Beahm, 279 Md. at 327,368 A.2d at 1009. 
ld. at 327,368 A.2d at 1009. 
Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1,536 A.2d 666 (1988). 
In re Rachel T., 77 Md. App. 20, 549 A.2d 27 (1988). 
See MCLAIN, supra note 21, § 803(4):1, at 220 (citing Cassidy, 74 Md. App. 1,536 A.2d 
666; In re Rachel T., 77 Md. App. 20, 549 A.2d 27); see generally John J. Capowski, An 
Interdisciplinary Analysis of Statements to Mental Health Professionals Under the 
Diagnosis or Treatment Hearsay Exception, 33 GA. L. REV. 353 (1999) (arguing that 
statements made to mental health professionals should qualify under the medical 
treatment hearsay exception). 
McLAIN, supra note 21, § 803(4):1 at 220 (citing Cassidy, 74 Md. App. 1,536 A.2d 666; 
In re Rachel T., 77 Md. App. 20, 549 A.2d 27). 
MCLAIN, supra note 21, § 803(4):1, at 220 (citing Cassidy, 74 Md. App. 1,536 A.2d 666; 
In re Rachel T., 77 Md. App. 20, 549 A.2d 27). 
Cassidy, 74 Md. App. at 6, 536 A.2d at 668. 
ld. at 6, 536 A.2d at 668. "Dr. Pullman also found significant the fact that the child, 
instead of resisting examination of the vaginal area, took her hands and pulled her labia 
apart. This, to her, indicated that the child had been sexually molested." Id. at 6, 536 
A.2d at 668. 
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girl approximately five times, "Who did this?" and each time, the child 
answered "Daddy.,,73 
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland found that the out-of-
court statements made by the child victim to Dr. Pullman did not 
qualify for admission under the common law medical treatment 
hearsay exception because the child's statements identifying her 
abuser were not pertinent to her medical treatment. 74 Relying on the 
common law philosophy, Cassidy stated that "[t]he doctrinal 
predicate-the underlying reassurance of trustworthiness - upon 
which this entire exception to the Hearsay Rule re.sts was ... entirely 
lacking in this case.,,75 The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
found that the two-year-old child victim was too young to understand 
the purpose of her examination by Dr. Pullman and "appreciate the 
critical cause-and-effect connections between accurate information, 
correct medical diagnosis, and efficacious medical treatment." 76 
Cassidy stated that "information about the cause or source of the 
condition that would influence the course of treatment came under the 
qualifying guarantee of trustworthiness" but that "other statements as 
to causation that simply fixed fault or identified the culprit would not 
come within the logic of the guarantee.,,77 Cassidy held that although 
the identity of an abuser may be of "social importance," it is "not 
ordinarily of strictly medical importance.,,78 Based on this reasoning, 
the removal of a child from a home in order to prevent future abuse by 
a member of the household is not considered as providing medical 
treatment to the child. 
73 ld. at 6, 536 A.2d at 668. For convenience, Cassidy treats the five repetitions of the 
hearsay statement as a single instance and treats the combined question by the physician 
and answer by the patient as one statement by the patient-"Daddy did this." ld. at 6, 
536 A.2d at 668. The word "this" in Dr. Pullman's question to the child victim referred 
to the bruises on her arms, legs, and buttocks. ld. at 7,536 A.2d at 669. The appellant in 
this case cohabitated with the child's mother and, while they lived together, the child 
referred to the appellant as "Daddy" even though the appellant was not the child's father. 
ld. at 5, 536 A.2d at 668. 
74 Jd. at 33-34, 536 A.2d at 682. 
75 Jd. at 30, 536 A.2d at 680. 
76 Jd. at 30, 536 A.2d at 680. 
77 ld. at 27,536 A.2d at 678. The court made an exception to its assertion that the identity 
of an abuser is "not ordinarily of strictly medical importance" by stating, in a footnote, 
that "[w]hen there is a danger that an assault victim may have contracted a 
communicable disease ... the identity of the assailant may take on significant medical 
pertinence." ld. at 33-34 n.14, 536 A.2d at 682 n.l4. 
78 Jd. at 33-34, 536 A.2d at 682. 
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In re Rachel T.,79 on the other hand, found that the abuser's identity 
was of medical importance and stated that "[a]scertaining the identity 
of the [child] abuser was ... important ... because effective treatment 
might have required Rachel's removal from the home."so In Rachel 
T., an almost five-year-old child sexual abuse victim was referred to a 
pediatric gynecologist by her pediatrician after the pediatrician 
examined the child victim and found "a fresh tear in her hymen, a 
significant amount of blood in the vaginal vault, and clotted blood in 
Rachel's rectum."SI A female social worker who was part of the 
pediatric gynecologist's teamS2 took Rachel's history and Rachel told 
the social worker "that she had a secret with her Dad and that if she 
told her Mom her father would be in big trouble."s3 After examining 
Rachel, the pediatric ~ynecologist opined that Rachel was a victim of 
ongoing sexual abuse. 4 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
77 Md. App. 20, 549 A.2d 27 (1988). 
Id. at 36, 549 A.2d at 35. 
Id at 24, 549 A.2d at 29. The pediatrician also found "that her rectal sphincter muscle 
was abnormally dilated" and that Rachel's "vaginal hymenal opening measured 15 
millimeters, a serious abnormal finding because a measurement exceeding five 
millimeters is considered to be significantly enlarged." Id. at 24,549 A.2d at 29. During 
his examination of Rachel, the pediatrician also "found remarkable the relaxed ease with 
which Rachel endured his examination." Id at 24,549 A.2d at 29. 
Id. at 25, 549 A.2d at 29. Rachel was treated at Chesapeake Clinic at the Francis Scott 
Key Medical Center. Id. at 25, 549 A.2d at 29. The clinic uses an interdisciplinary 
approach where "a female social worker may be asked to interview a young female child 
to gather a medical history, if the child seems to be uncomfortable with an adult male." 
Id. at 25,549 A.2d at 29. Here, the pediatric gynecologist asked the female social worker 
to take Rachel's history because Rachel was unwilling to talk to him. Id. at 25, 549 A.2d 
at 30. 
Id. at 25, 549 A.2d at 30. 
Id. at 25, 549 A.2d at 30. The pediatric gynecologist examined Rachel and "discovered 
that Rachel's vaginal opening and hymen were extremely dilated, and the widest he had 
seen in any child under the age of 10." Id. at 25, 549 A.2d at 30. The physician also 
"found diminished anal sphincter tone, which is a sign of sexual abuse if found in 
conjunction with a gaping hymenal orifice." Id. at 25,549 A.2d at 30. A staff member of 
the Department of Social Services of Maryland referred Rachel to Dr. Sweeney, a clinical 
psychologist who specialized in child sexual abuse cases. Id. at 25, 549 A.2d at 30. 
During Dr. Sweeney's examination: 
Rachel took the male adult doll, pulled his pants down, showed Dr. Sweeney 
the doll's penis and said, '[T]his is his tutor.' When asked if she had ever 
seen a tutor, Rachel replied, 'Yes, my daddy's.' Rachel grabbed the male 
doll's penis, put it in the female doll's genitalia and said, 'Tutor goes in here, 
too.' Rachel named the female doll 'Cindy' and said that the male doll was 
Cindy's daddy. She told Dr. Sweeney that Cindy's daddy had hurt Cindy by 
putting his 'tutor' inside her. When asked to show what had happened, Rachel 
depicted intercourse with the dolls. 
Id. at 26, 549 A.2d at 30. 
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The trial court, relying on Cassidy, excluded Rachel's statements to 
the social worker and physician as inadmissible hearsay and ordered 
that Rachel be returned to her parents because she was not in need of 
court protection.85 On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland vacated the decision and remanded for proper 
consideration.86 It held that Rachel's statements to the social worker 
and the physician fell under the medical treatment exception and were 
admissible.87 The court justified this decision by distinguishing 
Rachel T. from Cassidy in two ways.88 First, the court found that five-
year-old Rachel had higher "cognitive development" than the two-
year-old child victim in Cassidy and that Rachel's statements indicated 
a higher "degree of sophistication" than the statements made by the 
child in Cassidy. 89 Therefore, Rachel understood that her statements 
to the physician would be used to provide her with appropriate 
treatment.90 Second, the court held that the identity of the abuser in 
Rachel T was related to medical treatment because Rachel had 
internal injuries, may have contracted a communicable disease, and 
"effective treatment might have required Rachel's removal from the 
home.,,91 
The distinction that the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
makes between statements of medical versus social importance is, 
understandably, confusing to the trial courts. The Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland weighs different factors in similar cases leaving 
it unclear how the trial courts should rule on the admissibility of such 
statements. This confusion causes unnecessary reversible error at the 
trial level and increases the possibility of a retrial. Retrial creates 
unnecessary additional litigation costs and inefficiency in our judicial 
system. 
D. Treating v. Non-treating Physician Distinction 
Subsequent to Cassidy and Rachel T., in Low v. State,92 the Court 
of Special Appeals of Maryland further confused the case law in its 
85 Id. at 27-28, 549 A.2d at 31. 
86 Id. at 23, 549 A.2d at 29. 
87 Id. at 35-36,549 A.2d at 34-35. 
88 See MCLAIN, supra note 21, § 803(4):1, at 221 (explaining how the court distinguished 
Rachel T. from Cassidy). 
89 In re Rachel T., 77 Md. App. at 35, 549 A.2d at 34. 
90 Id. at 35, 549 A.2d at 34. 
91 Id. at 35-36, 549 A.2d at 35. 
92 119 Md. App. 413, 705 A.2d 67 (1998). 
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"treating versus non-treating physician,,93 analysis.94 In Low, a 
twelve-year-old child sexual abuse victim was examined by a 
pediatrician who was employed by the Montgomery County 
Department of Health and Human Services.95 The pediatrician found 
that the child's "vagina and anus both showed evidence of trauma and 
penetration by a foreign object.,,96 The pediatrician testified that the 
child told her that "the perpetrator" hurt her when he "put his penis in 
her vagina and in her 'butt' more than ten times.',97 The trial court 
determined that the out-of-court statements made by the child to the 
pediatrician fell under the medical treatment hearsay exception and 
admitted the testimony of the pediatrician.98 The defendant was 
convicted and he appealed.99 
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland reversed the conviction, 
holding that the testimony by the pediatrician about the child's 
statements did not fall under the medical treatment hearsay exception 
because: (1) the pediatrician who was employed by the Montgomery 
County Department of Public Health and Human Services examined 
the child "for the sole purpose of examining and detecting child 
abuse" on behalf of the prosecution; (00 and (2) there was insufficient 
evidence to show that the twelve-year-old child's subjective intent 
while being examined and interviewed by the pediatrician was "to 
communicate potential ailments or abuse in hopes of further 
treatment."(O( In a footnote, the Low court stated the following about 
the age discrepancy between the child in Cassidy and the child in Low: 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
Although [the child victim in Low] was significantly older 
than the child victim in Cassidy, given the facts in this case 
we do not believe that a twelve-year-old child any more than 
See supra notes 34-54 and accompanying text. This is a reference to the distinction made 
by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Candella between treating and non-treating 
physicians. See Candella, 277 Md. 120,353 A.2d 263 (1976). 
See McLAIN, supra note 2, § 803(4):1, at 223 (explaining that Md. Rule 5-803(b)(4) does 
not require that treatment actually be provided). 
119 Md. App. at 416, 421, 705 A.2d at 69, 71; cf Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 
(2004) (analyzing questioning by a government agent in relation to the Confrontation 
Clause). The Confrontation Clause analysis in Crawford relieves some of the pressure 
that the Maryland appellate courts have felt to exclude medical treatment hearsay 
statements especially when the statements were made to physicians hired by the 
government. 
Low, 119 Md. App. at 416, 705 A.2d at 69. 
Id. at 416, 705 A.2d at 69. 
Id. at 416-17,705 A.2d at 69. 
Jd. at 416-17, 705 A.2d at 69. 
100 Id. at 425, 705 A.2d at 73. 
101 Jd. at 425, 705 A.2d at 73. 
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a two-year-old child would have assumed that [the 
pediatrician] was examining her for the purpose of 
subsequent treatment. The age discrepancy in the two cases 
presents no meaningful distinction for purposes of our 
analysis. 102 
15 
This is a surprising statement by the court after it dedicated three 
paragraphs in Cassidy to discussing "maturity," "cause-and-effect 
connections," "conscious sophistication," and "purposeful motivation" 
in relation to the age of the declarant. I 03 
The Low court stated that it was "not entirely convinced by the 
record that [the pediatrician] 'could have' provided" treatment to the 
child victim. l04 However, the rule does not require that the physician 
actually provide treatment. lOS The rule states that the statements need 
only be made "for purposes of medical treatment" or for "medical 
diagnosis in contemplation of treatment." I 06 Physicians first diagnose 
a patient and then, if necessary, they treat the patient or refer the 
patient to another physician for treatment. l07 Medical treatment 
statements made by the patient to the physician during the diagnosis 
step are no less reliable when the diagnosis happens to be a diagnosis 
that does not require treatment. 108 As long as the patient "knows that 
the diagnosis is intended to determine whether treatment is needed ... 
the guarantee of sincerity is present.,,109 
E. Additional Factors Considered When Determining Admissibility of 
Statements 
Most recently, in Coates v. State of Maryland,llo the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland added more factors to consider when 
determining whether the medical treatment hearsay exception applies 
to statements made by child sexual abuse victims to a treating medical 
102 Jd. at 425 n.5, 705 A.2d at 69 n.5. 
103 See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text. 
104 Low, 119 Md. App. at 423, 705 A.2d at 72. Here, the child victim's laboratory and 
examination results showed no infections or abnormalities and therefore it was not 
necessary for the pediatrician to treat the child with medication or refer the child to 
another physician. Jd. at 428-36, 705 A.2d at 75-78. 
105 See MD. RULE 5-803(b)(4) (stating that the statement by the patient to the physician need 
only be made in contemplation of treatment). 
106 /d. (emphasis added). 
107 See McLAIN, supra note 21, § 803(4):1, at 224 (describing how diagnosis without 
treatment still falls under "in contemplation of treatment" found in the rule). 
108 Jd. 
109 Jd. 
110 175 Md. App. 588,930 A.2d 1140 (2007). 
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professional. III The court held that statements made by a seven-year-
old sexual abuse victim to a pediatric nurse practitioner during a 
medical examination were not admissible under the medical treatment 
hearsay exception because (1) the nurse practitioner's ~uestions 
"seemed to have an 'overarching investigatory purpose",;11 (2) the 
child did not see the nurse rractitioner until "more than a year after the 
end of the sexual abuse"; I 3 and (3) there was no indication that the 
seven-year-old child understood that "she was at continued risk of 
developing a latent, sexually transmitted disease or HIV.,,114 
In Coates, the mother of Jazmyne, a child sexual abuse victim, 
noticed that her daughter began to exhibit strange behavior in the fall 
of 2003. 115 In November 2003, Jazmyne asked her mother: "'[C]an 
little kids have babies?'" Her mother responded: '''No. Because if 
they do, they'll die.",116 Upon hearing this from her mother, Jazmyne 
began to scream for no apparent reason. ll7 The mother, Ms. Jenkins, 
testified that this was when Jazmyne "revealed that she had sex with 
[Coates]," Jenkins' former boyfriend whom Jenkins dated from spring 
1999 until September 2002. 118 Jazmyne told her mother that she had 
not told her mother about the abuse because "she was scared and 
didn't want to.,,119 On November 14,2003, Ms. Jenkins took Jazmyne 
to a medical facility where Jazmyne was examined by Heidi Bresee, 
III Id. at 627-28, 930 A.2d at 1163. 
112 !d. at 627-29,930 A.2d at 1162-63 (quoting State v. Snowden, 385 Md. 64, 91, 867 A.2d 
314,330 (2005)). 
113 Id. at 628-29,930 A.2d at 1163. 
114 Id. at 628-29, 930 A.2d at 1163. 
115 !d. at 598, 930 A.2d at 1146. The mother, Ms. Jenkins, recalled that, 
while in the tub, Jazmyne would 'sit on the soap or run the hot water on her 
body and just [exhibit] mannerisms that didn't seem normal for her.' In 
addition, Jazmyne would put the back of her heel near her vagina and she 
would just wiggle her ankle. Jenkins also observed Jazmyne insert the leg of a 
Barbie doll into her vagina. 
Id. at 598, 930 A.2d at 1146. 
116 Id. at 598-99, 930 A.2d at 1146 (alteration in original). Ms. Jenkins testified that that the 
child disclosed the information to her in November 2003, but a police report indicates 
that the authorities were told of the accusations on October 24, 2003. ld. at 599 n.1 0, 930 
A.2d at 1146 n.1 o. 
117 Id. at 599, 930 A.2d at 1146. 
118 Id. at 599,930 A.2d at 1146 (internal quotations omitted). Specifically, Jazmyne told her 
mother that Coates "'put [his] dingy inside of her coochie. ", Id. at 599, 930 A.2d at 1146 
(alteration in original). 
119 Id. at 599, 930 A.2d at 1146. 
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who was a Sexual Assault Forensic Examination (SAFE) nurse and a 
d· . . . 120 pe mtnc nurse practitIOner. 
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that the nurse 
practitioner's questions to Jazmyne about what had happened to her 
had an "overarching investigatory purpose."121 The nurse 
practitioner's questions elicited the identity of the abuser and did not 
pertain to a medical purpose or Jazmyne's health needs. 122 The court 
found that the identity of the abuser was of no concern for medical 
treatment purposes because Jazmyne was not in contact with Coates, 
no longer was in any immediate danger, and therefore would not need 
to be removed from the home.123 
In addition, the court "consider[ed] it significant that Jazmyne saw 
[the nurse practitioner] more than a year after the end of the sexual 
abuse, and at a time when she had no physical manifestations of illness 
or injury.,,124 It is interesting, for several reasons, that the court found 
this time lapse significant. First, child sexual abuse victims often cope 
with the abuse by trying not to think about the abuse. 125 Sexual abuse, 
especially of children, is often not disclosed by victims until some 
time after the abuse has occurred when the victim is reminded of the 
past traumatic experience and has an intense emotional reaction to a 
present situation. 126 Second, the absence of an obvious physical injury 
does not foreclose the possibility that the child was abused.127 The 
short and long term effects of sexual abuse can include less obvious, 
psychological symptoms such as anxiety, fear, nightmares and sleep 
problems, acting out and general misbehavior, withdrawal, regression, 
poor self-concept, depression, developmentally inappropriate sexual 
behavior, and post-traumatic stress disorder. 128 
Finally, the court found that Jazmyne did not have any 
understanding "that she was at continued risk of developing a latent, 
sexually transmitted disease or HIV.,,129 Most children do not have 
120 ld. at 599, 930 A.2d at 1146. 
121 ld. at 627,930 A.2d at 1162 (quoting State v. Snowden, 385 Md. 64, 91, 867 A.2d 314, 
330 (2005)). 
122 ld. at 627, 930 A.2d at 1162. 
123 See id. at 628, 930 A.2d at 1163. 
124 Jd. at 628, 930 A.2d at 1163. 
125 JOHN E. B. MYERS, LEGAL ISSUES IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT PRACTICE 10 
(2d ed. 1998). 
126 Id. at 14. 
127 See id. at 10-17 
128 Jd. 
129 Coates, 175 Md. App. at 628, 930 A.2d at 1163 (2007). 
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this level of understanding. But, most children can understand that if 
they are visiting a hospital, talking with a uniformed nurse 
practitioner, and being examined in an examination room that the 
nurse practitioner is generally providing them with medical treatment. 
In Maryland, it follows, in order for her statements to the medical 
professional to be admitted as evidence against her abuser, a seven-
year-old child sexual abuse victim must, at a minimum, (1) understand 
that she has been sexually abused, (2) notify a responsible adult about 
the abuse promptly after she is abused,130 (3) hope that the adult seeks 
immediate medical treatment for her, (4) not reveal the identity of her 
abuser during questioning by a medical professional unless she knows 
it is important to prevent her continued exposure to the abuser, and (5) 
comprehend that there is a medical purpose for the medical 
examination. This is a lot to ask of a child sexual abuse victim. The 
factors which were given weight by the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland are understandable to lawyers and fit into nice, neat factor 
categories in a judicial opinion but are unrealistic when applied to real 
life situations like Coates. 
Maryland's common law approach has caused its courts to struggle 
with how to categorize statements made by patients to physicians 
under Md. Rule 803(b)(4) because the common law rationale is 
confusing and not conducive to drawing bright lines. l3l For example, 
during a physician-patient relationship, a physician can assume 
multiple, different roles along a continuum that may vary or go back 
and forth between diagnosing and treating roles. In addition, in certain 
circumstances, the physician-patient relationship never reaches the 
treating phase on the physician role continuum because the patient is 
seeking the physician's opinion in preparation for litigation or the 
patient is simply not seeking treatment. 
By relying on the common law approach to the medical treatment 
hearsay exception, Maryland excludes, as substantive evidence, 
statements made by patients to physicians hired for litigation 
purposes. 132 The failure of Maryland trial courts to exclude such 
statements has resulted in reversible error and costly and time-
130 Cf MD. RULE 5-802.1 (d) (stating that "[a] statement that is one of prompt complaint of 
sexually assaultive behavior to which the declarant was subjected if the statement is 
consistent with the declarant's testimony" is not excluded by the hearsay rule if the 
statement was previously made by a witness who is now subject to cross-examination). 
131 See supra part III. 
I32 See MCLAIN RULES, supra note 7, § 3(c)(iii), at 217; see also supra note 34 and 
accompanying text (noting the rationale for the common law approach). 
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consuming retrials. 133 In order to avoid reversible error and also 
comply with the common law principles, Maryland's trial courts are 
forced to be more conservative and decline to admit medical treatment 
statements, even though they have sufficient indicia of reliability and 
trustworthiness, simply because the statements were made to a non-
treating physician. 
Maryland's approach is underinclusive because it excludes reliable 
and trustworthy statements made by patients to non-treating 
physicians. Maryland's common law approach to the medical 
treatment hearsay exception does not allow the trier of fact to hear all 
statements made by patients to physicians, whether treating or non-
treating, and decide, based on the totality of the circumstances, if the 
statements are reliable and trustworthy. 
IV. THE MODERN FEDERAL APPROACH TO THE MEDICAL 
TREATMENT HEARSAY EXCEPTION 
The federal approach to the medical treatment hearsay exception 
simplifies the trial procedure by obviating the need for limiting 
instructions which are of doubtful utility134 and avoids 
"overexclusion" by not distinguishing between treating and non-
treating physicians. It makes it unnecessary for the trial court to 
separate physical medical treatment from emotional medical 
treatment; to establish different rules for internal versus external 
injuries; or to divide the role of medical professionals into two 
separate and distinct roles---one of social importance and one of 
medical importance. 
Under FRE 803(4), as under the Maryland rule, there are three 
types of statements made by patients to physicians "for purposes of 
medical diagnosis or treatment" that may be admitted as substantive 
evidence: (1) "medical history"; (2) "past or present symptoms, pain, 
or sensations"; and (3) "the inception or general character of the cause 
or external source thereof.,,135 These three types of statements are 
admissible if they are "reasonably pertinent to [either] diagnosis or 
treatment." 136 Thus, FRE 803(4) changed prior law in two major 
ways.137 First, FRE 803(4) "adopted an expansive approach by 
133 See generally Coates, 175 Md. App. 588, 930 A.2d 1140; Low v. Stale, 119 Md. App. 
413, 705 A.2d 67 (1998). 
\34 MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 278, at 288. 
\35 FED. R. EVID. 803(4). 
136 FED. R. EVID. 803(4); United States v. Iron Shel\, 633 F.2d 77, 83 (8th Cir. 1980). 
137 Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 83. 
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allowing statements concerning past symptoms and those which 
related to the cause of the injury.,,138 Second, FRE 803(4) "abolished 
the distinction between the doctor who is consulted for the purpose of 
treatment and an examination for the purpose of diagnosis only.,,139 
A. No Limited Purpose Exception 
The Advisory Committee's Note to FRE 803(4) discounts the 
common law approach of giving limiting instructions to jurors with 
regard to statements made by patients to physicians who have been 
hired only for litigation purposes. 140 The Committee asserts that a 
limiting instruction to a jury which requires the jury to use certain 
evidence only to prove the basis of an expert witness' conclusion, and 
not to prove the truth of the matter asserted, is a distinction that is 
"most unlikely to be made by juries.,,141 
Although the limiting instruction that distinguishes the basis of an 
expert's conclusion and the truth of the matter asserted may be 
confusing for jurors, jurors are insightful in other ways. Jurors bring a 
variety of experiences and points of reference to a jury. Armed with 
these real-life experiences and common sense, a juror "is likely to 
view with suspicion a patient-client's self-serving statements to a 
'hired gun' expert witness.,,142 Under the federal approach, juries hear 
the evidence, assess the credibility of the statements, and apply the 
appropriate weight to the testimony in making its decision. The 
federal approach is fairer, more understandable, and far easier to 
administer than the Maryland common law approach as can be seen 
from the case law applying the federal rule. 
B. No Treating v. Non-treating Physician Distinction 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which 
has been the leading circuit on this issue, clarified the federal approach 
138 fd. 
139 fd. 
140 See FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee's note (asserting that a limiting instruction 
to a jury which requires the jury to use certain evidence only to prove the basis of an 
expert witness' conclusion and not the truth of the matter asserted, is a distinction "most 
unlikely to be made by juries"). At common law, statements made by a patient to a 
treating physician may be admitted as substantive evidence while statements made by a 
patient to a non-treating physician may only be admitted to explain the basis of the non-
treating physician's conclusions. See supra part II. 
141 FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee's note. 
142 McLAIN, supra note 21, § 803(4):2, at 229. 
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by applying a two-part test in 1980 in United States v. Iron Shell. 143 In 
Iron Shell, a nine-year-old child victim of sexual abuse was examined 
by a physician, Dr. Mark Hopkins, approximately two hours after the 
alleged sexual assault. 144 During the medical examination, Dr. 
Hopkins posed questions to the child, and the child answered them. 145 
Dr. Hopkins testified at trial that the child told him that "she had 
been drug into the bushes, that her clothes, jeans and underwear, were 
removed and that the man had tried to force something into her vagina 
which hurt.,,146 Dr. Hopkins testified further that the child told him 
that she had tried to scream for help but couldn't because "the man put 
his hand over her mouth and neck.,,147 Dr. Hopkins' physical 
examination of the child revealed that there was "a small amount of 
sand and grass in the perineal area but not in the vagina," the child had 
"superficial abrasions on both sides of [her] neck," and there was "no 
physical evidence of penetration, the hymen was intact and no spenn 
was located.,,148 The defendant was convicted of assault with the 
intent to commit rape and he appealed. 149 
The court of appeals found that the child's statements to Dr. 
Hopkins fell primarily within the "inception or general character of the 
cause" category ofFRE 803(4).150 The court held that the child had a 
strong motive to tell the truth and her statements were "reasonably 
pertinent to diagnosis or treatment" and were therefore admissible 
under this hearsay exception. 151 Thus, the court developed a two-part 
test based on the common law rationale and on a reasonableness 
standard to help it apply FRE 803(4).152 
The first part of the test considers whether the patient's motive is 
"consistent with the purpose of the rule.,,153 This step focuses on the 
subjective intent of the patient and relies on a patient's strong motive 
to tell the truth to a physician because the patient wants to receive 
143 633 F.2d at 84-85. 
144 See id. at 81. 
145 Id. at 81-82. 
146 !d. at 82. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 80. The defendant raised ten different issues on appeal. Id. at 82. This article 
addresses only one of the ten issues-the admission of statements made by the child to 
Dr. Hopkins during his examination of the child. Id. 
150 See id. at 83 (citing FED. R. EVID. 803(4) (setting out the requirements for admission of 
statements under the medical treatment hearsay exception)). 
151 Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 83-84. 
152 Id. at 84. 
153 Id. 
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proper diagnosis or treatment. 154 The purpose of the physician's 
examination was to diagnose the child, treat the child, if necessary, 
and preserve any evidence. 155 The child's statements concerned "what 
happened rather than who assaulted her" and "were related to her 
physical condition," and therefore, the statements "were pertinent to 
diagnosis and treatment" and fell "within the scope of the rule.,,156 
The second step of the test considers whether it is "reasonable for 
the physician to rely on the information in diagnosis or treatment.,,157 
This step is different from the first step in that it is an objective, 
instead of subjective, analysis. It is also different in that it focuses on 
the reliance of the physician, instead of on the trustworthiness of the 
patient. The court held that Dr. Hopkins reasonably relied on the 
child's statements in order to properly diagnose and treat the child and 
therefore the statements also satisfied the second part of the test. 158 
Iron Shell analogizes the second part of the test to the ~rinciple 
underlying the Federal Rule of Evidence 703 ("FRE 703,,).15 Under 
FRE 703, underlying facts or data need not be admissible in order for 
an expert opinion to be admitted as long as the facts or data are "of a 
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in 
forming opinions.,,16o The corollary part of the Iron Shell test 
"recognizes that life and death decisions are made by physicians in 
reliance" on statements made by patients that are pertinent to diagnosis 
or treatment and therefore those statements should have "sufficient 
trustworthiness to be admissible in a court oflaw.,,161 If the statement 
is trustworthy enough for a doctor to use it in making life and death 
decisions about medical diagnosis or treatment, it is trustworthy 
enough for a court to admit it as substantive evidence at trial. 162 
154 /d. (citing Meaney v. United States, 112 F.2d 538, 539-40 (2d Cir. 1940) (describing how 
a patient has a motive to speak the truth when the patient speaks to the physician about 
present and/or past symptoms because the information is important to the patient's 
treatment); see supra part II. 
155 Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 84. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 84-85. Dr. Hopkins testified that a "discussion of the cause of the injury was 
important to provide guidelines for his examination by pinpointing areas of the body to 
be examined more closely and by narrowing his examination by eliminating other areas." 
Id. at 84. 
159 Id. 
160 FED. R. EVID. 703. 
161 Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 84. 
162 Id. However, FRE 703 was amended in 2000 and the "new language tips more against 
admissibility" for the limited nonhearsay purpose than the pre-2000 language did. 
McLAIN RULES, supra note 7, § 3, at 166 (emphasis added). The 2000 amendment to 
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The Eighth Circuit applied the Iron Shell two-part test in United 
States v. Renville. 163 In Renville, an eleven-year-old child sexual 
abuse victim was examined by a family practice physician, Dr. Clark 
Likness, after the child's stepfather alleged sexually abused her. 164 Dr. 
Likness testified that the child told him that her stepfather had had anal 
intercourse with her and performed cunnilingus on her. 165 The jury 
found Renville guilty and he appealed. 166 The court of appeals held 
that the statements by the child to the physician passed the two-part 
test from Iron Shell and were therefore admissible. 167 First, the child's 
motive in making the statement was consistent with the purposes of 
promoting treatment. 168 Second, the content of the statement was such 
as is reasonably relied upon by a physician in treating or diagnosing a 
patient. 169 
The court focused on the second part of the test in its analysis in 
order to understand if the identity of the abuser was reasonably 
pertinent to treatment. 170 Although Iron Shell did not involve a 
statement that identified an abuser, Iron Shell had cautioned that the 
defendant's identity "would seldom, if ever" be reasonably pertinent to 
FRE 703 might weaken the parallel made in Iron Shell, but it does not weaken the 
rationale of Iron Shell's two-part test or the federal approach. The pre-2000 FRE 703 
stated: 
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion 
or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or 
before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the 
particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts 
or data need not be admissible in evidence. 
McLAIN RULES, supra note 7, at 357. 
The 2000 amendment added: "Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be 
disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court 
determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion 
substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect." FED. R. EVID. 703. The current FRE 703 
is intended to cover "facts or data that cannot be admitted for any purpose other than to 
assist the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion." FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's 
note. This intention "provides a presumption against disclosure to the jury of information 
used as the basis of an expert's opinion and not admissible for any substantive purpose." 
!d. 
163 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1985). 
164 ld. at 432. 
165 ld. 
166 ld. at 43l. 
167 !d. at 439. 
168 ld. at 436. 
169 See id. 
170 ld. at 436-39. 
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treatment or diagnosis. 17I The Renville court reasoned that one of the 
"seldom" times that the identity of an abuser might be reasonably 
pertinent to treatment is when a child makes a statement to a physician 
that identifies her abuser as someone who is a member of the child's 
household. l72 In this situation, the identity of the sexual abuser is 
imperative to proper treatment of the child because the "exact nature 
and extent of the psychological problems that ensue from child abuse 
often depend on the identity of the abuser.,,173 
V. MARYLAND SHOULD ADOPT THE FEDERAL APPROACH 
Maryland's common law approach to the medical treatment hearsay 
exception is outdated and is causing confusion in Maryland courts. 174 
The federal approach allows jurors to hear statements made by patients 
to physicians for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment, no matter if the 
physician is a treating or non-treating physician. 175 The jury can then 
assess the appropriate weight to the credibility ofthose statements. 176 
171 Id. at 436 (quoting United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 84 (8th Cir. 1980)); see also 
United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 1979). Iron Shell relied partly 
on the Advisory Committee's Note to FRE 803(4) that gave an example that "a patient's 
statement that he was struck by an automobile would qualify but not his statement that 
the car was driven through a red light." FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee's note; 
see also United States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252, 289 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (statement by 
a patient to a physician that he was shot is admissible but a statement that he was shot by 
a white man is not admissible because the shooter's skin color is not pertinent to medical 
treatment or diagnosis). Statements concerning the identity of a sexual abuser are 
different from statements about a car running through a red light or a white man shooting 
someone. In child sexual abuse cases, the identity of the abuser is critical to proper 
treatment of the child, whereas the identity of the defendant or of who was at fault in an 
accident has nothing to do with treatment. Id. 
172 Renville, 779 F.2d at 436-37. 
173 Id. at 437. Dr. Likness testified that '''there is an ongoing emotional trauma, and an 
emotional trauma that is sometimes extremely hard to define, but it shows up and affects 
all of those people that have been abused in some way or form. ", /d. at n.11. He stated 
that emotional trauma is something that does not "'necessarily show up in a physical 
exam, but are definitely important in the well being of this child.'" Id. Dr. Likness 
further testified that understanding emotional trauma helps him understand "'how I then 
will be able to take care of her in the future, what type of sexual care does she need 
medically, psychiatrically, and how is it going to affect her life. ", Id. In addition, he 
testified that the identity of the abuser is "extremely important" for the purpose of 
diagnosis and treatment of the child. Id. at n.12. He stated that if the abuser is someone 
that is close to the child-"'someone who she lives with, someone who she spends time 
with and if she can tell [him 1 that there have been several'" ongoing incidents of abuse, 
then the chances of that abuse continuing is "'very, very high.'" Id. 
174 See supra part III. 
175 See supra part IV. 
176 See supra part IV. A. 
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Juries are insightful when it comes to distinguishing between a 
patient's interest in receiving proper medical diagnosis and treatment 
and a patient's interest in enhancing symptoms to get a larger damage 
award. 177 Maryland does not need to follow a confusing common law 
approach to the medical treatment hearsay exception to "weed out" 
money hungry plaintiffs looking to win big from employers and 
insurers. Juries can do that very effectively. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Under Maryland's common law approach to the medical treatment 
hearsay exception, Maryland juries are not given the opportunity to 
hear and evaluate whether to rely on statements made by patients to 
physicians, unless those statements fit into a very narrow and 
underinc1usive category. Maryland case law applying the common 
law approach to the medical treatment hearsay exception is unduly 
complicated and confusing. The federal approach to the medical 
treatment hearsay exception is fairer and easier for trial courts to 
apply. The federal approach does not require the trial court to separate 
physical medical treatment from emotional medical treatment, to 
establish different rules for internal versus external injuries, or to 
divide the roles of medical professionals into two separate and distinct 
roles. Maryland should therefore adopt the federal approach to the 
medical treatment hearsay exception and allow the jury to weigh the 
credibility of statements made by patients to physicians, no matter 
whether the physicians are treating or merely diagnosing. 
177 See supra part IV. A. 
